2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

5-6-2010

Enrico Ciarrocchi v. Kennedy Memorial Hospital

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010

Recommended Citation
"Enrico Ciarrocchi v. Kennedy Memorial Hospital" (2010). 2010 Decisions. 1380.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/1380

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-3718
___________
ENRICO J. CIARROCCHI,
Appellant
v.
KENNEDY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL; JOSEPH RODI;
DEBORAH RIGGS; MICHAEL CIARROCCHI
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 1:09-cv-04468)
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 4, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges
Opinion filed: May 6, 2010
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
Enrico Ciarrocchi, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s orders
dismissing his complaint and denying his motion for reconsideration. For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm.

I.
Because the background of this case is familiar to the parties, we discuss it
only briefly here. In June 2008, Ciarrocchi filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 in the District Court against Kennedy Memorial Hospital (“Kennedy Memorial”),
Deborah Riggs (his ex-wife), Michael Ciarrocchi (his brother), and Joseph Rodi (his
uncle). He claimed that the defendants had violated his “constitutional and civil rights”
by having him involuntarily hospitalized at Kennedy Memorial in the mid-1990s. Rodi
moved to dismiss the complaint, and both Kennedy Memorial and Riggs later moved for
summary judgment.
In February 2009, the District Court granted each of these motions,
dismissed the complaint as to Ciarrocchi’s brother (who had yet to enter an appearance in
the case), and closed the case. In doing so, the court concluded that res judicata barred
Ciarrocchi’s case because a New Jersey state court had previously adjudicated his claims.
The District Court further held that his claims were also barred by the statute of
limitations. Ciarrocchi subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court
denied. He did not appeal from any judgment in that case.
In August 2009, Ciarrocchi filed a second §1983 complaint in the District
Court, raising the same claims against the same defendants. On September 3, 2009, the
District Court, acting sua sponte, entered an order dismissing this second complaint. The
court, like before, concluded that res judicata and the statute of limitations barred
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Ciarrocchi’s claims. The court further held that dismissal was also warranted because
none of the defendants appeared to be “state actors” under § 1983. Finally, the court,
noting that Ciarrocchi had filed “numerous other cases in this District, many of which
have been dismissed on the Court’s sua sponte review,” (Dist. Ct. Mem. of Sept. 3, 2009,
at 2-3 n.2), ordered that “if [Ciarrocchi] attempts to relitigate these same claims against
these same defendants for a third time, the Court will be obligated to enjoin [him] from
filing any claims in this District without permission of the Court.” (Id. at 4.) Ciarrocchi
subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied in an
order entered on September 11, 2009. He now appeals from both that order and the
court’s September 3, 2009 order.1
II.
The term “res judicata” encompasses the concepts of both issue preclusion
and claim preclusion. Venuto v. Witco Corp., 117 F.3d 754, 758 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997).
Issue preclusion, which is relevant here, “prevents parties from relitigating an issue that
has already been actually litigated.” Peloro v. United States, 488 F.3d 163, 174 (3d Cir.
2007). Issue preclusion applies when: “‘(1) the issue sought to be precluded [is] the same
as that involved in the prior action; (2) that issue [was] actually litigated; (3) it [was]
determined by a final and valid judgment; and (4) the determination [was] essential to the
prior judgment.’” Id. at 175 (quoting Burlington N. R.R. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co.,
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We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3

63 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (3d Cir. 1995)). Although a defendant generally must raise issue
preclusion as an affirmative defense, see Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412-13
(2000), “‘if a court is on notice that it has previously decided the issue presented, the
court may dismiss the action sua sponte, even though the defense has not been raised.’”
Id. at 412 (quoting United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 432 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
Issue preclusion clearly applies here, as the instant complaint sought to
relitigate the same claims that the same District Court had rejected in his earlier federal
case. Accordingly, the District Court did not err in sua sponte dismissing the instant
complaint or denying his motion for reconsideration.2 Given that Ciarrocchi has filed
several meritless actions in federal court and has attempted to raise the instant claims on
multiple occasions, the District Court was within its discretion to warn him that, if he
were to file the same suit again, the court would require him to obtain its permission to
file any future actions. We must stress, however, that if Ciarrocchi does attempt to file
this same suit again, the District Court must afford him an opportunity to oppose such an
injunction before imposing it. See Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993).
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Because we conclude that issue preclusion bars Ciarrocchi’s instant
claims, we need not address whether § 1983 was the proper vehicle for asserting those
claims.
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In light of the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s orders of
September 3, 2009, and September 11, 2009, respectively. Rodi’s motion for leave to file
a responsive brief beyond the time set forth in the briefing schedule is denied as moot.
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